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TELEVISION, MELODRAMA, AND THE RISE OF THE
VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
ELAYNE RAPPiNG

In 1974, I saw a movie that sent chills down my spine. It was called
Death Wish and it told the story of a mild-mannered liberal businessman
whose wife and daughter were brutallr raped and murdered by a group of
dark-skinned, near subhuman thugs. His response to his grief was to
become a self-styled vigilante, stalking the New York City streets in
search of other muggers and rapists, all young, apparently deranged, and
dark-skinned, and to shoot them down in cold blood. The audience
cheered more loudly at each burst of vengeful gunfire, for, as Leonard
Maltin, has rightly noted, the film was a masterpiece of "manipulation at
its zenith.",3 It was also, I now see, the beginning of a slow but insidious
trend in national consciousness and criminal justice policy away from the
liberal policies of the Warren Court, with its concerns for the rights of
defendants to be protected from possible abuses by the engines of the
state, toward a far more reactionary (in the truest sense of that word),
often even bloodthirsty, concern for the "rights" of "victims" to revenge
and punishment of the most extreme kind. The trend is evident in a variety of ways and places, but it can be seen most dramatically in the rise of
the increasingly influential Victims' Rights Movement.
In this paper, I explore the genealogy of this movement's rise to
prominence, and argue that, while there were several contributing elements-the shift to the right in national political sensibilities and its impact on criminal legal procedures being among the most obvious-it has
been television, and especially the coming of cameras in the courtroom
and the rise of the televised trial as major media event, which has been
most influential. For in transforming legal proceedings into dramatic
spectacles, informed by the most melodramatic of pop culture genres and
conventions, television has, not necessarily intentionally, given emotional aid to a movement which, like the so-called Right to Life movement, depends on sentimental, emotionally loaded images and narratives
1. See DEATH WISH (Paramount Pictures 1974).
2. See id.
3. LEONARD MALTiN, LEONARD MALTIN'S 1997
(1997).
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to influence our common understandings of and attitudes about criminal
justice in ways which are more politically dangerous than they may
seem.
As a genre film, of course, Death Wish was not new. The revengefilm genre has been around as long as Hollywood itself, and it has always
incorporated themes and conventions informed by a recognizable set of
assumptions about law and criminal justice. Thomas Schatz in his influential study of Hollywood Genres described genre films as "sociological
events," "objectified mass dreams" which work "to solve, if only temporarily, the conflicts which have disturbed the community welfare.A
Crime and the fear of crime, especially violent crime, are certainly
among the most emotionally loaded of those "disturb[ances] of community welfare." 5 And revenge, as acted out in such genre films as Death
Wish and Dirty Harry,6 has an obvious emotional appeal. It satisfies our
desire for the kind of instant gratification that the slowly grinding wheels
of actual justice rarely provide. As Carol Clover noted in her analysis of
rape revenge movies, 7 there is a far greater emotional charge to the endings of B movies like I Spit on Your Grave,8 in which the abused woman
takes the law into her own hands and gleefully wreaks vengeance on her
assailant, than in movies like The Accused,9 in which the resolution is a
far less dramatically satisfying legal one.' 0
William Ian Miller, in an interesting study of Clint Eastwood's revenge films, describes revenge as "a style of doing justice"" made necessary when the state cannot or will not take effective action against
crime. "It is not just that popular culture invents the avenger, that it invents a more efficient style of justice for us, frustrated as we are by our
fears, our anxieties, our perceptions of violence and crime," 12 he writes.
4.

THOMAS SCHATZ, HOLLYWOOD GENRES 22(1981).

5. Id.
6. DIRTY HARRY (Warner Brothers 1971).
7. See CAROL CLOVER, MEN, WOMEN AND CHAIN SAWs: GENDER IN THE MODERN
HORROR FILM 137-154 (1992).

8. 1 SPIT ON YOUR GRAVE (Cinemagic Pictures 1983).
9. THE AcCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988).
10. See generally id.
11. William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: PopularCulture's Theory of
Revenge, in LAW IN THE DOMAIN OF CULTURE, 161, 198 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1998).
12. Id. at 199.
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"Popular culture is also largely responsible for creating our image of the
avenger's straw men: the legal system.... constructs images of a largely
inept law and in turn constructs a view of society desperately in need of
efficient and effective mechanisms of social control. 13
Miller sees these films as out of keeping with current attitudes in the
real world of criminal justice. In our legal system, he argues, revenge is
associated largely with "the ineffable vulgarity of young lower-class
males"' 14 and given little respect. "Revenge is not a publicly admissible
motive" 15 today, he argues. "Church, state and reason all line up against
it.,,16 "Retribution," a related but far weaker concept, "can still be mentioned in polite company," he believes, because it implies "a controlled,
proportional" 17response to wrongdoing, and, since it is impersonal and
administered by the state, involves no emotional tone.1 8 But the demand
for revenge as a legal remedy is considered far too extreme for rational,
civilized societies.
The recent textbook Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice-to my
knowledge, one of the few available on the subject-seems to support
Miller's argument about the marginalization of revenge in current criminal justice discourse. 19 The author begins his chapter on "Media and the
Construction of Crime and Justice" by defining the concerns of criminal
justice as "the opposing ideas of due process and crime control, 20 while
making no mention at all of the concepts of punishment or retribution,
much less revenge. Nonetheless, Miller argues, there is an emotional
need in most of us for a more emotionally resonant way of doing justice,
and the revenge genre fills that need.2 1 These films please us, he says,
13. Id. at 199-200. Thus, the genre typically reflects great hostility toward the concept of the presumption of innocence and no sympathy whatever for the insanity defense,
under any circumstances. These are also characteristics of the Victims' Rights Movement, as the trial of Colin Ferguson, in which the most passionate and vengeful Victimimpact statements were hurled at a defendant clearly incapable of understanding what
was being said.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 162.
See generally ROBERTNozIcK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 163 (1982).
See generally RAY SURETrE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND JUSTICE (1998) (arguing that

18.
19.
Surette's book supports the argument that revenge is marginalized).
20.
21.

Id.at 1.
See generally Miller, supra note 11.
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because they work as fantasies, satisfying that "repressed segment of us"
that craves such
gratifying emotional closure, no matter what the legal
22
system says.
Miller's argument rests on the insightful assumption that revenge
fantasies have traditionally reflected the subconscious need to gratify
urges which civilized society represses. 2 3 But I would argue that the repressed desires expressed in revenge-genre films are in fact less and less
repressed; that, on the contrary, there is a quite dramatic return to the
fashionability of the revenge model of justice in this country, engineered
in great part by the growing influence of the Victims' Rights Movement,
although it differs in important ways from Miller's generic model. For in
the Victims' Rights Movement's model, revenge is no longer associated
with the disreputable "vulgarity of young lower-class males," 24 but with
the most respectable, middle- and upper-class segments of our population; those who see themselves as "victims," more often than not, of today's version of "vulgar, lower class youth"--usually poor inner-city
blacks, the most demonized figures in media treatments of crime today.
Indeed, it is this very model of revenge-the respectable, white middleclass citizen avenging himself on the vulgar, lower-class, dark-skinned
youthful predator-that movies like Death Wish 25 and Dirty Harry2 6 so
ominously herald. And it is this model which televised trials more and
more often present to an American public whose growing hunger for
vengeance it feeds and nurtures.
Interestingly enough, in an "Unconcluding Postscript," to his essay,
Miller himself acknowledges the possible return of the revenge model
and attributes it, quite rightly, to the increased merging of popular culture
convention and legal reality. 27 Indeed, he describes Court TV as the most
seamless example of this merging of "the law of popular culture and the
'real' thing." 28 For it is on Court TV that law most dramatically and explicitly becomes entertainment. Nor is he particularly alarmed about this
turn. "Popular culture sees revenge as a necessary supplement to the

22. Id. at 165.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 162.
25.

DEATH WISH, supra note 1.

26.
27.
28.

DIRTY HARRY, supra note 6.
See Miller, supra note 11, at 201.
Id. at 200.
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law," he writes, "and it might well be that popular culture is not
wrong. ' 29 I will argue that popular culture is indeed quite wrong. But I
will be arguing against the grain of popular sentiment. For the popularity
of Court TV,the endless legal chit-chat on twenty-four-hour news, on
like Cops 30
talk channels like CNBC and MSNBC, and on tabloid series
and America's Most Wanted,3 1 indicates that more and more Americans
share Miller's view.
I. A GENEALOGY OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
Before turning to the ways in which TV has helped to create support
for a model of criminal justice based more on revenge than rehabilitation
or retribution, more on passion than reason, and more on concern for
victims than for those whose life and liberty are threatened by the state, it
will be useful to turn briefly to some of the legal and social factors that
have given rise to these attitudes. For mass media never single-handedly
creates trends in popular sentiment. Rather it works in tandem with other
forces in the social and political environment to reflect and reinforce
dominant sentiments and attitudes. In the case of Victims' Rights, however, television has played an especially important role, because, as a
visual, dramatic medium, it has the power to forge larger-than-life,
melodramatic images of human suffering and to elicit strong emotional
responses which are in keeping with the rhetoric of Victims' Rights. In
this, of course, it resembles Hollywood revenge films. The difference
however-that television is dealing not with fantasies but with real human beings and real events that have real consequences for the individuals involved as well as society in general-makes its use of generic conventions a far more serious matter.
In an article entitled Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims Rights
Amendment Is a Bad Idea,32 Bruce Shapiro documents his contention
that "In ...American politics today, victims of violent crime are accorded uniquely sanctified status."'33 He quotes Democratic Attorney
General Janet Reno's address to a Victims' Rights Convention in which
29. Id. at 201.
30. Cops (Fox Network).
31. America's Most Wanted (Fox Network).
32. Bruce Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment
Is a Bad Idea, THE NATION, Feb. 10, 1997.
33. Id. at 11.
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she attests to drawing "the most strength from victims, for they represent
America to me: people who will not be put down, people who will not be
defeated, people who will rise again and again and stand for what is
right.... You are my heroes and heroines," she gushes, "You are but
little lower than the angels." 34 Shapiro insists that "this is not just rhetoric" 35 and he is right. In the 1996 elections, eight states added victims
rights language to their constitutions, joining twenty-eight others; Carolyn McCarthy, the wife and mother of two of Colin Ferguson's victims,
won a seat in Congress; 36 the Justice Department doubled its victims assistance budget to $400 million; 37 and President Clinton, speaking in the
Rose Garden, added his support to the movement by insisting that "the
only way to give victims equal and due consideration" would be to
amend the Constitution of the United States.3 8 Thus, the powerful influence of a movement began as a small group of grass roots support and
advocacy groups, but, in the past fifteen years, has ballooned into a major force of some 8,000 organizations, 39 most of them funded by right
wing groups and politicians. Shapiro refers to the movement, as a
"vengeance-rights lobby, ' '4° and indeed, many of its demands-for
swifter executions and longer prison terms, for example-smack of the
style of justice depicted and valorized in the revenge-genre movies
41
Miller analyzes.
Of course there has been a trend toward harsher punishments and
greater numbers of executions in this country for quite a while, and the
trend is in keeping with the rightward drift of the nation around many
issues, fueled in part by an increasing fear that society has become too
permissive. But Victims' Rights advocates are among the major players
in this trend and their success in recent years has been notable. Among
the more important markers of this success was the Supreme Court ruling

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Larry Sutton and Paul Schwortzmen, McCarthy Wins Seat on L.L, N.Y.
DAILY NEWs, Nov. 6, 1996 at 7.
37. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 11-12.
38. Id. at 12.
39. See id.
40. Id.at 13.
41. See generally Miller, supra note 11.
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in 1991, in Payne v. Tennessee,42 that victim-impact statements would be
permitted in sentencing hearings in death penalty cases. 43 Only a few
years earlier, in Booth v. Maryland,44 the Court had narrowly defeated
such a ruling.45 Nor was the 1991 decision unanimous. 4 6 Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented,4 7 and Stevens, in his strongly
worded dissent, expressed particular alarm. 48 Among his concerns was
that such statements would tell juries that "some of the murdered dead
were more equal than others-and that defendants who killed 'important'
people were more deserving of execution." 49 But more importantly, he
noted, with concern, "the current popularity of capital punishment... the
political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of
sentences is the best cure for... crime, and the political strength of the
'victims' rights' movement." 50 Given this turn in popular opinion he
will be greeted with enthusiasm
wrote, "I recognize that today's decision
51
by a large number of... citizens."
Given the current popularity of capital punishment in a crimeridden society, the political appeal of arguments that assume that
increasing the severity of sentences is the best cure for the cancer
of crime, and the political strength of the "victims' rights"
movement, I recognize that today's decision will be greeted with
enthusiasm by a large number of concerned and thoughtful citizens. The great tragedy of the decision, however, is the danger
that the "hydraulic pressure" of public opinion that Justice
Holmes once described and that properly influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures -- has played a role not only
in the Court's decision to hear this case, n4 and in its decision to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

501 U.S. 808 (1991).
See id. at 827.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
See id. at 509.
See Payne, 501 U.S. at 844-67 (Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., dis-

senting).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See id.
See id. at 856-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 867.
Id.
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reach the constitutional question without pausing to consider affirming on the basis of the Tennessee Supreme Court's rationale,
but even in its resolution of the constitutional issue involved.
Today is a sad day for a great institution.52
Stevens was in the minority however, 53 and these statements are now
a staple of death penalty sentencing hearings, whose impact, with the
advent of televised trials, reaches far beyond the twelve jurors to whom
they are immediately addressed.
Which brings me to the question of cameras in the courtroom, another important decision made by the Supreme Court 54 within the context
of social and political trends. Charles Nesson and Andrew Koblenz, in an
article entitled The Image ofJustice,5 5 discuss the long winding path by
which the Supreme Court was persuaded in 1981, after long years of opposing such a measure, to allow the televising of criminal trials without
the defendant's consent. 56 They argue that the Justices' decision was
' 57
based largely on the court's concern for "the appearance of justice"
and its "preoccupation with judicial image."'5 8 "In the Madison Avenue
world of image," they argue, "true damage is done to the image ofjustice
and courts only if the specter of injustice strikes the public imagination
and is widely communicated." 59 In recent years, of course, in part due to
a backlash against the Warren Court's decisions in matters of defendant's
rights and the sense that society has become overly permissive generally,
it is just such a specter of justice as ineffective, as "soft on crime," as
incapable of controlling street crime or punishing wrongdoers-the very
features of law as straw man which Miller notes as a staple of the revenge genre-that has more and more informed public discourse. According to Nesson and Koblenz, "Televising trials looked to some judges
like a possible counter to [such] charges against the judiciary," for "trials

52 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 866-67.
54. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
55. Charles R. Nesson & Andrew Koblenz, The Image of Justice: Chandler v.
Florida,16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 405 (1981).
56. Seeid. at405-13.
57. Id. at 405.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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show the justice system at its best."
But of course this assumption has not always proven true. In fact, in
the early days of Court TV,the most high-profile trials, the ones that
most caught public attention and engendered TV talk-show debate, were
not particularly good examples of justice at work-at least in the eyes of
the public. The first Menendez brothers trial and O.J. Simpson trial both
tended to further inflame public outrage at a system in which people
seemed literally to get away with murder. And because of this, judges
and prosecutors had to learn to conduct their trials in ways that would
produce the salutary results which the justices hoped for when they allowed the cameras in. For, as Steven Russell has noted, "In high profile
criminal trials judicial concern is with what kind of story the camera will
tell.... about the criminal justice system. Will it be a hegemonic narrative ('system works') or a subversive narrative ('The system is broken')?",61 And most commentators agreed that the messages of the Menendez and Simpson trials were anything but hegemonic; in fact, they
were exactly what the justices hoped to counter: subversive narratives
which upheld the popular perception that the system was indeed broken.
After these trials, there was more and more apprehension on the part
of judges and prosecutors about cameras in courtrooms. Judges, wary of
the bad publicity Judge Lance Ito received for his lax handling of the
Simpson case, became more and more concerned about their own appearance as tough, decorous presiders over justice. If Ito was the model
of what not to do, Judge Matsche, who presided over the Oklahoma City
bombing trial in which Timothy McVeigh was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, was heralded as a model of judicial authority and
wisdom.62 Media commentators could not say often enough how sad it
was for the nation that this trial was not televised, for it did exactly what
Nesson and Koblenz argue was called for, when cameras were allowed
in: it showed the system working, justice being done, punishment being
buzzword of the Victims' Rights Moverendered, and "closure"--the
63
ment-being achieved.

60. Id. at 408-09.
61. Steven Russell, Undercurrents of Judicial Policy: Demystifying the Third
Branch of Government and the O.J. Simpson Case, in REPRESENTING O.J. 174 (Gregg
Barak ed, 1998).
62. See Orderin the Court,THE INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, June 6, 1997, at A14.
63. See Andrew Cohen, Lessonsfrom the Timothy McVeigh Trial, MEDIA STUDIES
JOURNAL 11 (Winter, 1998).
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Not surprisingly, the emotional heat of that courtroom was, according to those present, palpable. 64 Andrew Cohen, a Denver lawyer and
journalist who was present at the McVeigh trial, described it as a masterpiece of legal management of dramatic effect:
One day it was one of the government's star witnesses, come to
tell the eerie tale of McVeigh's bombing plans... [n]ext it might
be one of the many sad survivors of the bombing, come to tell
her tale of woe. And if it wasn't the witnesses themselves, it was
the way prosecutors arranged their order. If the jurors appeared
to be getting sleepy.., a survivor whose testimony woke everyone up and got them good and sad [was brought on].... Lawyers are convinced they need drama and entertainment in an ae
when attention spans have been diminished by television ....
Cohen argues that the McVeigh trial, with its plethora of victims and
tales of loss and suffering, bloodshed and gore, was a model of how such
drama and entertainment could be most effectively provided.66
In the wake of the McVeigh trial, judges and prosecutors have become more and more adept at using the techniques described by Cohen,
and apparently to good effect. In March of 1999 the American Bar Association conducted a survey of public opinion about the workings of the
justice system and found that indeed, in the last decade, Americans'
opinions of the court system has risen significantly, while other institutions-especially the media and Congress-were deemed even more corrupt and ineffective than in previous years. 67 Their recommendation was
that in order to further educate the public about the judicial system, and
so further improve its public image, the Supreme Court, so long adamantly opposed to being televised, should now allow cameras into its
own proceedings.68

64. See id.
65. Id. at 15-16.
66. See Cohen, supra note 63.
67. See Linda Greenhouse, 47% in Poll View Legal System as Unfair to Poor,
N.Y. TIMEs, February 24, 1999, at A12.
68. See id.
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II.

THE POWER OF MELODRAMA

The power of televised trials to influence popular views of the justice
system has thus been as successful as the justices hoped, but only after a
period of trial and error in which judges and prosecutors learned to use
television in ways that were most likely to produce hegemonic narratives
in which the system was shown to work. And the role of victims in these
made-for-TV spectacles has been particularly effective in creating this
image, since audiences tend to empathize with feelings of victims and
share their satisfaction in verdicts in which those convicted of victimizing innocent citizens are harshly punished. But even before the advent of
televised trials, when the Victims' Rights Movement was just beginning,
it recognized that television could be a powerful tool in pleading its
cause, and found ways to make use of it. In fact, the ties between Victims' Rights and television date back to 1983, when a man named John
Walsh-the father of a kidnapped child, who quickly became a prominent spokesperson for the movement-became the first of what is now a
long line of celebrity victims, as I think of them, the most well known
being the fathers of Ron Goldman and Polly Klaas, both of whom have
logged a lot of air time, as viewers of TV news will be aware. In that
year, Walsh's story was made into a docudrama, called Adam, 69 which
was so successful that in 1986 it was followed up by a sequel called
Adam: His Song Continues.70 Two years later Walsh parlayed the success of these movies, in which the conventions of melodrama were used
to instill pity (for the victims) and fear (of the monstrous predators) into
media stardom by becoming the host of his own tabloid TV series,
America's Most Wanted.7 1 The series, which featured reenactments of
actual crimes followed by pleas to viewers to help catch the still-at-large
perpetrators, was a success with audiences as well as the FBI, which
on the series and welcomed his help in catching alworked with Walsh
72
criminals.
leged
But as Anna Williams explains in an article about the series, the format was not only sensational and melodramatic in form and style, it was
explicitly oriented toward a view of crime as a family matter, for it in69. See Anna Williams, Domesticity and the Aetiology of Crime in America's Most
Wanted, CAMERA OBSCURA 97-120 (January-May, 1993), at 97-8.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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variably pitted victims of traditional nuclear families against the harrowing images of criminals as antisocial loners and lunatics preying on
women and especially children.73 Michael Linder, one of the series producers, explained the criteria for choosing cases for the series in an issue
of TV Guide: "A drug dealer who shoots another drug dealer is not as
compelling as a child molester or murderer .... If a man brutalizes innocent children, that definitely adds points." 74 Such a hierarchy of victimization is a mainstay of the Victims' Rights Movement, which plays upon
notions of decent families besieged by violent amoral criminals.
When the series was renewed in 1995 after a brief absence, it had an
even more programmatic focus on victims as a cohesive social grouping
of good solid citizens and families, fighting the dark armies of antisocial
predators. The former grouping of course included the assumed viewers,
"we" out there in television land who-as is typical of the television announcer's address to audiences-were assumed to be members of middle-class families among whose defining characteristics (along with the
desire for, and money to afford, advertised commodities, of course), was
fear of crime. To make this point dramatically clear, Walsh even added a
subtitle to the new series: America Fights Back.7 5 And America, in this
case, included only those of us in the target audience of middle class
family members fearful of crime. Thus the series constructed itself as a
leading component of what was by then a growing national trend in media, in the courts, and in the growing Victims' Rights Movement, dividing American society into two groups defined by their relationship to the
criminal justice system: those who prey on others and those who "fight
back." Indeed it is arguable that television today-thanks to series like
these, as well as televised trials and the commentary they engender, is
informed by a fairly new and prominent, if not dominant, thematic: the
division of society into criminals and crime fighters. We are all either
cops or robbers today, and for those of us on the side of the angels,
vengeance for crimes against "innocent victims" is our virtuous stock in
trade.
Docudramas like the Adam movies and tabloid TV series both employ the conventions of melodrama to engage viewers and elicit emotion
and sympathy and a desire for harsh, vengeful punishment. The kidnap73.
74.
loids,TV
75.

See id.
Van Gordon Sauter, Rating the Reality Shows and Keeping Tabs on the TabGUIDE, May 2, 1992, at 18.
See Williams, supra note 69.
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ping of little Adam Walsh, the rapes and murders of innocent women and
children on Walsh's America's Most Wanted, these are the images and
narratives that fuel the kind of testimony that so moved jurors in the
MeVeigh trial. And as more death penalty trials are televised, we are
seeing more of the power of melodrama to sway the public to the views
of Victims' Rights advocates. Among other ominous trends is the increasing demand by victims to be present and witness the executions of
those convicted of killing loved ones. On a recent local newscast, for
example, I heard the mother of a murder victim say, with an intensity
that was frightening, "I want to be there; I want to be in the front row
when they kill that guy; I want to be the one to pull the toggle switch!"
This example is not atypical of what one hears in televised victimimpact statements. Emotion and passion are more and more present in
courtroom proceedings and their impact on jurors and viewers cannot be
denied. But is this kind of melodramatic, often hysterical utterance actually appropriate to the adjudication of legal matters? Are the revenge
genre and its conventions actually preferable to the pre-1991 sentencing
procedures? To answer that question we might look briefly at the genre
of melodrama itself and the political imaginary it constructs. The dominant characteristic of melodrama, as has often been noted, is "excess."
"The genre's very existence," writes Peter Brooks in his definitive study
of melodrama, "is bound to [the] possibility, and necessity, of saying
everything., 76 John Cawelti describes the genre as creating a world of
"moral fantasy"' 77 whose function is to show the essential rightness of the
world order, an order which "bear[s] out the audience's traditional patterns of right and wrong, good and evil." 78 Melodrama, according to Laurie Schulze, is "a preferred fictional context for addressing disturbing
social materials" for these reasons. 79 And Lynn Joyrich notes that its
"popularity has historically coincided with times of intense social and

76. PETER BROOKS, THE MELODRAMATIC IMAGINATION: BALZAC, HENRY JAMES,
MELODRAMA AND THE MODE OF EXCESS 203-04 (1976).
77. See generally JOHN G. CAWELTI, ADVENTURE, MYSTERY, AND ROMANCE:
FORMULA STORIES AS ART AND POPULAR CULTURE (1976).
78. David Thorbum, Television Melodrama, in TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL VIEW
628 (Horace Newcomb ed., 1995).
79. Laurie Schulze, The Made-for-TV Movie: IndustrialPractice,CulturalForm,
PopularReception, in Newcomb ed., supra note 78, at 169 (Horace Newcomb ed., 5th
ed. Oxford U.. Press 1994).
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ideological crisis," 80 of which our own postmodem era, often called by
its theorists "the age of crisis" 8 1 is certainly one. According to Joyrich,
melodrama, which creates a space for moral closure in a confusing
world, acts as a soothing antidote to the anxiety engendered by such periods of history. 82 It does this by first gratifying the desire for "immediate sensation"8 3 by portraying "behavior shocking to its time" 84 and then
offering "moral simplification, [and] reassuring fantasies," 85 which act as
cathartic agents of reassurance that the horror has been contained.8 6 This
is certainly the pattern of death penalty sentencing hearings, in which
shocking behavior and its impact on survivors is used to titillate,
frighten, and enrage viewers, even as the final sentencing, especially if it
is as harsh as the victims demand, offers a utopian fantasy of moral closure, in which the highly personalized resolution of one person's experience of victimization, through the court's revenge on a single perpetrator,
suggests, disingenuously, that the larger problem of social violence itself
has somehow been "solved."
Another important element of melodrama which many theorists have
commented upon is "sentimentality," a term I believe gets at the heart of
what is most frightening and dangerous about the movement for victims'
rights and the media's complicity in furthering its goals. Sentimentality
is generally understood to be a kind of false, excessive, insincere, and
hypocritical form of emotion. It is what is meant by the term "crocodile
tears," the often inappropriately excessive and insincere display of grief
and sorrow, by those who presumably have some other motive or agenda
that the display of grief serves to mask. Indeed, Jungian analyst MarieLouise von Fraanz, in defining the distinction between the sentimentality
of melodrama and true grief, notes, importantly, that "where there is sentimentality... there is also a certain amount of brutality." 87 She uses the
80. Lynn Joyrich, All That Television Allows, in , PRIVATE SCREENINGS:
TELEVISION AND THE FEMALE CONSUMER 227, 233 (Lynn Spigel & Denise Mann eds.
1992).
81. See id. at 233.
82. See generally Joyrich, supra note 81.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See generally Joyrich, supra note 80.
87. Quoted in IMITATIONS OF LIFE: FILM & TELEVISION MELODRAMA, 381 (Marcia

Landy ed., 1991).
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example of the Nazi general Goering who "could sign the death sentence
for three hundred people but if one of his birds died then that fat old man
would cry.... He is a classic example," she writes, for "Cold brutality is
very often covered up by sentimentality." 88 I would certainly agree, for it
is clear to me, having spent many hours studying tapes of victim-impact
statements, that there is a great deal of cold brutality masked by sentimentality in the rhetoric and displays of grief of many of the spokespersons for victims and their "rights."
This is an insight which needs to be more fully considered by those
whose honest concern for the suffering of victims leads them to support
demands for such legal remedies as the Victims' Rights Amendment.
Beneath the compelling emotion that informs the demands of victims,
there is all too often an ugly and irrational cry for blood that smacks of
mob violence and vigilante justice. And of course such emotions and
their ability to fuel desperate, irrational actions are the very stuff of revenge-genre films like Death Wish, in which audiences cheer the coldblooded murder of individuals for whom due process has become an annoying distraction from the true needs of society for immediate, harsh
punishment.
Lauren Berlant has written brilliantly about the dangers of sentimentality in the legal and political spheres. 89 She labels the period we
live in "an age of sentimental cultural politics," 90 in which rhetorics of
utopian/traumatized feeling91-which as we have seen are characteristic
of the melodramatic imagination and its underlying assumptions-are
dominant. 92 Berlant believes that:
[U]topian/traumatized subjectivity ... has replaced rational
subjectivity as the essential index of value for personhood and
thus for society. Revelations of trauma, incitements to rescue, the
reprivatization of victims as the ground of hope, and above all,
the notion that feeling itself is the true self, the self that must be

88.

89.
(1997).
90.
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92.

MARGARET BULLITT-JONAS, HOLY HUNGER: A MEMOIR OF DESIRE 253 (1999).
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93
protected from pain ....

These, Berlant believes, are the marks of the politics of sentimentality. And they have led, according to Berlant, to a situation in which we
are increasingly governed by policies based on an assumption of "the
self-evidence and objectivity of painful feeling and the nation's duty to
eradicate it."' 94 The danger here, says Berlant, is that questions of social
inequity and social value, are now adjudicated in the register not of
9
power, but of "sincere surplus feeling."
Berlant-whose focus is actually on the Right to Life Movement, but
whose arguments apply equally well to the politics of victimology and
Victims' Rights-argues that the political struggles in which sentimentality is deployed most effectively are those which find "validity in those
seemingly superpolitical moments when a 'clear' wrong-say, the spec96
tacle of children violently exploited-produces a 'universal' response."
These are struggles informed by "a politics of protection, reparation, rescue." 97 They "claim a hardwired truth, a core of common sense" which is
beyond ideology, beyond mediation, beyond contestation and "which
seems to dissolve contradiction and dissent." 98 The fantasy of reparation,
the valorization of "surplus" or excess feeling, the tendency to substitute
passion for reason in determining political and legal policy-all these of
course are elements of the melodramatic imagination which television, in
fiction, in docudrama, in tabloids, and now in trials, makes such effective
use of. And as Berlant warns, a political movement based on such precepts must be viewed with grave suspicion. For when reason becomes
overwhelmed by emotion, the rule of law itself is in danger of being
usurped.
During the McVeigh trial I watched the nightly press conferences in
which victims and survivors cried out for blood and what most struck
and frightened me was that the most passionate of these people, the
mQst-in their own minds-severely injured or bereft were also the most
vociferously contemptuous and proudly ignorant of the Constitution and

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

BERLANT, supra note 90 at 35
See BERLANT, supra note 89, at 35
See BERLANT, supranote 89, at 35-7.
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the law. Like the fictional heroes of revenge-genre films, they wanted
swift and immediate reparation for their losses and they had no trust at
all in the wimpish ways of a legal system, which they saw as run by devious, sleazy attorneys and inept or corrupt officials. And like those heroes, these passionately articulate and righteously indignant individuals
were all too easy to sympathize with. Who could not empathize with the
grandmother who took her two small boys to a day-care center and never
saw them again, especially when, as is common in the Victims' Rights
Movement (as it is in the Right to Life Movement), heart wrenching or
horrifying images are deployed as the most powerful elements of the political argument? In the wake of the bombing, and then the trial, endless
pictures of smiling children, only recently alive, along with carefully
chosen images of a tiny shoe lying in the rubble or a tiny limb found lying far from the body it had only recently been part of, were shown on
TV screens virtually twenty-four hours a day for several weeks. Such
10 0
images do indeed seem to be "superpolitical," "beyond ideology,"' to
use Berlant's terms. But they are deployed in the service of an agenda
which is intensely political and ideological.

III. VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND LEGAL THEORY
Of course there are many prominent theoretical and legal defenders
of the Victims' Rights Movement whose arguments are neither sentimental nor melodramatic, but based on a particular view of the criminal
justice system and how it should operate in ways which are fair and balanced. Paul Gewirtz, and others associated with the storytelling trend in
legal studies, are among the most persuasive in their support for the role
of victims in trials. Gewirtz argues that the use of victim-impact statements corrects an imbalance in criminal proceedings which allow the
victims to be doubly "silenced" by her or his murderer and then by the
criminal justice system. 10 1 For, he argues, in our current system the defendant alone has a legal spokesperson, or advocate, while the victimwhose injury is considered an injury to the state rather than a personal in-

99. See generally BERLANT, supra note 89 (explaining that various television
melodramatic images are superpolitical in nature).

100. See id.
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jury-is actually represented by no one. 102 He rightly notes that "criminal trials have become a central moral arena for society,"' 0 3 but he sees
this arena as one in which the defendant is central because "[t]he main
dynamic ... is to support the norms of socially acceptable behavior by
defining othemess ... the twisted deviance of Susan Smith, the apparently brazen evil of the Menendez brothers. ' ' 1°4 Gewirtz believes that the
true center of the trial should not be the defendant, but rather the victim, 105 for, in his view, "The victim is the subject of the trial, so the victim's place as at least a character in the criminal trial's narrative is defi10 6
nitional."
In fact, the portrayal of the criminal trial as one in which the deviance or otherness of the criminal defendant holds center stage, and the
moral issue revolves around determining the extent of this "deviancy"
and punishing or repairing it, has, until recently, been quite accurate. Indeed, as Foucault most famously demonstrated (and as I have discussed
elsewhere), 10 7 it has been the tradition of liberal democracies to focus on
the criminal as a deviant. 10 8 In fact the situation Gewirtz describes and
deplores is the very one which Foucault most definitively traced and elucidated in all his writings on crime and punishment, especially Discipline
and Punish10 9 and "The Dangerous Individual." 110 Crime, as Foucault
saw it developing in the discursive turns of modem democratic thought,
was for the most part a defect, or infection, of the body politic."I' "This
deviation, this potential danger, this illness" was how he described
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1977) (demonstrating the criminal as a deviant).
109. See id.
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criminality,112 as it had been constructed within modem discourses. And
'
113
he
because the criminal was now seen as a "pathologized subject,"
was, according to Foucault, discursively transformed from a figure of
essential evil whose crimes were to be morally condemned and punished,
to a subject of study for the new science of criminology to analyze and
114
develop suitable correctional treatment. No more the harsh physical
punishments of an earlier time, when moral terms such as "good" and
"evil" defined the egregious acts which were the law's only concern.
Now it was the diagnosis and treatment of "the little soul of the criminal"
that were of concern. 1 15 And for such a task, a "gentler way of punish1 17
ment"' 116 in which "docile bodies" ---disciplined from birth to internalize and conform to the norms of society or feel guilt for failure to do
but smoothly inteso-could be easily managed within a multipartite
118
effective.
and
sufficient
was
grated social system,
Foucault's analysis has certainly been influential. And to a great extent his model of criminal justice in which the defendant as deviant, to be
studied and controlled by mental health experts, is the main focus still
has validity. 119 But as he himself understood, shifts in social paradigms
tend to overlap so that old belief systems and traditions tend to coexist, at
to fit new eras and new
least for a time, with new paradigms which arise
120
morally.
and
ways of thinking, intellectually
I would argue that such is the case today, for we are living in an era
in which dominant paradigms of belief and tradition of all kinds are increasingly up for grabs and new models and attitudes are arising to replace the old. The Victims' Rights Movement, and the complementary
legal and political movements and trends that accompany it, in particular,
are signs that in matters of crime and justice, Foucault's model is increasingly being displaced by a new paradigm of justice, a post-
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Foucaultian model more suited to our present era, which is far less
marked by the traditions of liberal democracy and far more repressive
and punishment-oriented in every arena, but especially that of criminal
justice.
In fact, if we view the coming of the Victims' Rights Movement as
part of a trend toward what Berlant calls an "age of sentimental politics" 12 1 in which the rhetoric and assumptions of the melodramatic
imaginary have become dominant political forces, 122 it is far easier to
describe the current legal turn in terms of the thinking of Emile Durkheim than Michel Foucault. For while Foucault saw punishment, especially brutal physical punishment, as a thing of the past, no longer necessary in the professionally managed social environment of liberal democracies,123 Durkheim believed that punishment, and its moral implications,
were very much central to the functioning of modem societies. 124 In fact,
his theories of the social uses of punishment are very close indeed to the
ways in which melodrama functions to provide reparation for suffering
and moral closure to the vexed issues of the day. Punishment, according
to Durkheim, "does not serve, or else only serves quite secondarily, in
correcting the culpable or in intimidating possible followers ....
125
Its
true function is to maintain social cohesion intact, while maintaining all
its vitality in the common conscience." 12 6 Thus, for Durkheim, punishment for moral wrongdoing must be central to any stable social order, for
it serves to reassert the moral foundation upon which such societies
stand. 127 Punishment, for Durkheim, is a "form of moral action 12 8
which, at least in part, represents "the deeply felt beliefs of common
people."' 12 9 "Laws and state actions,"' 130 he says, express such beliefs.
But even more importantly perhaps, they actually "seek to transform and
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reshape [dominant moral beliefs] in accordance with a particular vision
of society"' 13 1 which reflects the gradually shifting moral sensibilities of
132
new generations. Durkheim's views on punishment then, which have
not recently received the attention of Foucault's, seem to be very much
in tune with the changing times in which we live, times in which vengeance, punishment and a very strong sense of moral outrage and133selfjustice circles.
righteousness are more and more in style in criminal
IV.

THE MANY USES OF MELODRAMA

I want to end this study by returning to the question of popular culture genres and their uses in circulating and reinforcing dominant views
about criminal justice and institutional operations generally. For while it
is true, as I have been arguing, that the Victims' Rights Movement has
employed the conventions of melodrama to serve its own political ends,
melodramatic conventions need not necessarily serve any particular political agenda, and, in fact, have as much power in portraying progressive, anti-hegemonic narratives as their opposite. This is an important
point because it brings us back to the question of the media's role in defining and furthering political agendas. The media of course do not operate in a political or social vacuum and they do not, on their own, drive
the engines that bring certain political ideologies to the fore while pushing others into the shadows. Rather, they tend to both reflect and reinforce dominant views and agendas in ways which are quite complex.
Court TV and the other media paraphernalia by which criminal trials
to
have become major cultural and ideological events do indeed seem 134
Victims' Rights.
of
agendas
the
furthering
in
forcefully
work most
But, as we have seen, the coming of cameras in the courtroom was the
result not of network executives' efforts but of a political and juridical
move on the part of those whose own interests were in preserving
135 Once the courts had alhegemonic beliefs in American institutions.
lowed cameras in courtrooms, however, it was only a matter of time before media executives put it to profitable use, a use which tended-as the
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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its inception through 1998 resulted in conviction.
135. See Nesson & Koblez, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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justices hoped-to serve hegemonic ends. 136
But in earlier, more progressive eras, when progressive social
movements had more influence on media producers than they do today,
the conventions of melodrama, on rare but often important occasions,
have been bent to the needs of surprisingly subversive, anti-hegemonic
ideals, most notably in certain popular and influential docudramas.
Whether or not melodrama is used in subversive or hegemonic ways,
then, will depend on many factors, political as well as cultural and esthetic. Court TV, which actually produces its own series of docudramas
called Trial Story137 -in which actual trial footage of dramatic or controversial trials is edited down to a one-hour narrative in which justice is
seen to be done, or at least closure is achieved-can be counted on to
produce its docudramas in ways which most often serve hegemony for
reasons which involve the workings of the criminal justice system. For,
as is well known, a very small percentage of cases ever actually go to
trial. And of those that do go to trial and may be televised, over ninety
percent result in convictions. 138 This is because prosecutors tend to plead
most cases out unless they feel they have a good chance of winning.
Thus, it is far more likely that victims and their spokespersons will have
starring roles in "Trial Story" segments, and that these stories will end
with the hegemonic message that "the system does work" because criminals are punished severely, either with death or life with no parole, which
in Court TV's televised criminal trials are common sentences.
Network-produced docudrama, on the other hand, at least on occasion will show the defendant as sympathetic and heroic, and even push
the envelope of hegemony a bit to the left.
To illustrate this point, and tease out some of its political implications, I want to briefly compare a particularly effective and dramatic
segment of Trial Stoly from 1995, Georgia v. Redding: A Rapist on
Trial,13 9 with an equally effective docudrama made in 1984, also featuring the issue of violence against women, The Burning Bed.14 The Burning Bed is the story of a woman who, after seventeen years of brutal
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beatings by her husband, and a constant, consistently useless effort to
find redress through the existing institutions of the state, set her husband's bed on fire, fled with her children, and was acquitted on the
1
grounds of temporary insanity. 14 This was of course the precedentsetting case in which the battered woman syndrome was introduced into
legal proceedings. 142 But it was also a precedent-setting case for network
television, for it showed a woman murdering her husband and walking
away free. 143 The radically anti-hegemonic nature of this message to
women, and to men, should not be minimized. The case, which I have
written about elsewhere, 144 was a result of long years of feminist organizing; and the movie, which drew huge audiences, did much to publicize
the problem.
As this brief summary must make clear, there is quite a bit of melodrama in The Burning Bed. But it is deployed in a way very different
from the Trial Story145 narration of a rape trial in which the two victims-one, a working-class single mother; the other, a feminist professor-were the primary prosecution witnesses. And the differences have
much to do with the very different ways in which the issue of victimization is presented in each, and the very different approaches to the problem of violence against women and how it might be "cured." For while
the Burning Bed 14 6 focuses on institutional failure, and on the plight of
147
the victim herself in her efforts to free and empower herself, Georgia
v. Redding focuses, as is common in televised criminal trials, on suffer14 8 The women who were raped in this
ing, punishment, and revenge.
case were presented, at great length, retelling in tearful, emotional tones,
the horrors of their experiences, while the defendant, an African American male, sat silently throughout, hardly the center of the proceeding
149
which Gewirtz assumes the defendant to be. The goal of these women
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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BurningBed).
145. Trial Story, supra note 142.
146. The BurningBed, supra note 143.
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was to seek vengeance and punishment for what was done to them, and
to force the criminal justice system to act in their behalf in seeing that the
defendant received the harshest possible sentence.1 50 And, as is most
usual in these programs, the7y were, after years of single-minded pursuance of this goal, successful.
Of course The BurningBed also featured emotional testimony from
the victim and her children.15 2 But in this case the perpetrator (who was
already dead) was not a major figure of concern. 153 Rather, by making
the victim herself the defendant, and sanctioning her right to defend herself and her children against further, possibly deadly, abuse, the movie
managed to put American society, rather than an individual evil man, on
trial. 154 In fact, to its credit-and in dramatic contrast to the rape revenge
films Clover analyzes-the abuser in this movie is seen not as inhumanly
monstrous or alien to the human race, but as rather pathetic and desperate, and as much a product of sexist socialization as his victim. 15 5
I bring up this comparison of two narratives of violence against
women in order to point out the ways in which the construction of melodramatic narratives-what is put in and, more importantly, what is left
out-convey messages to viewers about what constitutes a social problem and how it may be remedied. The Victims' Rights Movement, and
the televised trials and tabloid series that support it, present an image of
the social ills that most trouble us as inevitably and narrowly the concern
of criminal justice. They do not in any real sense allow for consideration
of the larger social forces and structures which would help us make sense
of crime by understanding its root causes and imagining possible remedies beyond the emotional satisfaction of seeing a single defendant punished for a single act. But in viewing social issues from the narrow point
of view of a victim's suffering and revenge, these media genres tend to
repress history and the contradictions it contains in ways which, according to Frederic Jameson in his famous study of The Political Uncon-
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scious, 156 inevitably repress the implicit utopian element present in all

revolution that would have to take place if
literary and media texts: the 57
occur.1
not
did
the repression
158
Finally, as the Georgia v. Redding case illustrates, where supporters of Victims' Rights worry that victims have no voice, allowing them
to speak, at length and with great passion, creates the possibility of the
opposite danger: the diminishing of the role of the defendant who, as in
so many such cases, has few to speak for him and few, especially, who
are as articulate and sympathetic as the victims and their supporters. And
yet, in the wave of backlash against the Warren Court decisions, and the
powerful presentations of victims through the media, it should not be
forgotten that it is the defendant whose very life is on the line.
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